International Environmental Justice on Hold: Revisiting the Basel Ban from a Philippine Perspective by Gutierrez, Richard
Gutierrez (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2014 7:11 PM 
 
399 
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE  
ON HOLD: 
REVISITING THE BASEL BAN FROM A PHILIPPINE 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
RICHARD GUTIERREZ† 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Nineteen years after the Basel Ban was adopted it still has not 
garnered the necessary ratifications to enter into force.   This article aims 
to revisit the Basel Ban and understand it from the perspective of a 
developing country, particularly the Philippines, and draw out possible 
obstacles it faces in ratifying this instrument of international environmental 
justice.  In addition the article will review the major issues raised by those 
opposed to the Basel Ban and verify if these concerns raised nineteen years 
ago still hold true today. 
This article has four main sections.  The first section of this article 
briefly looks at the roots of international environmental justice in domestic 
environmental justice. The second section reviews the rise of toxic waste 
trade in the 1980s and the eventual rise of the Basel Convention and the 
Basel Ban.  The article delves into the framework of the Basel Convention 
and the Basel Ban, their weaknesses and the elements of environmental 
justice found in both instruments. 
The third part of the article examines the current landscape of the 
Basel Ban from the perspective of a developing country, the Philippines.  
The Philippines is similar to many developing countries, with its high 
incidence of poverty and its own experience with illegal toxic waste trade.  
The Philippine perspective is important because it was a party to the Basel 
Convention when the Basel Ban was adopted. Thus, it is one of the 
qualifying countries whose ratification is needed for the Basel Ban to enter 
into force. Moreover, the Philippines is often cited as a case where the 
Basel Ban could cause adverse impacts on the local recycling industry and 
in turn affect national development. 
In examining the Philippine context, the article focuses on the trade in 
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used lead acid batteries (ULABs) and electronic waste (e-waste) and where 
the country derives these wastes for its recycling industry.  The article will 
also examine the “anti-trade” arguments leveled against the Basel Ban 
and the agreements that the Philippines has entered into to see the 
precedents the government is following, if any. 
The last section of this article is the conclusion.  What is critical at 
this point in the ongoing saga of the Basel Ban is for countries to re-
examine the issues surrounding the Basel Ban, and see if the arguments of 
the past still hold true.  Undoubtedly, the Basel Ban has firmly left its mark 
in international law.  Whether it remains a paper tiger will depend on the 
perseverance of developing countries to fight for this principle at the 
international level and ratify the instrument, and its observance and 
implementation nationally at the domestic level. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Basel Ban Amendment [the Basel Ban] has been hailed as a 
triumph of international environmental justice by some sectors and 
criticized by others as counterproductive to environmentally sound 
management of hazardous wastes.  Its role in international law, particularly 
in the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal [Basel Convention] has been both polarizing and 
empowering. 
The Basel Ban has polarized developed countries such as the US and 
Japan from developing countries in their steadfast opposition to it.  
However, the Basel Ban has also greatly empowered developing countries 
in asserting their sovereignty against toxic waste dumping and has forced 
developed countries to re-evaluate their policies on toxic waste trade. 
This section briefly looks into the principles that helped define the 
Basel Ban. 
 
Toxic Waste Dumping and Environmental Justice 
The 1970s and 1980s were a period that saw heightened public 
concern about hazardous waste in the United States (US) and in the world.1  
The heightened awareness resulted in increasing public resistance to the 
 
 1.  See Alan Andrews, Beyond the Ban – Can the Basel Convention adequately Safeguard the 
Interests of the World’s Poor in the International Trade of Hazardous Waste?, 5/2 L. ENV’T & DEV. J. 
167, 169–70 (2009), available at http://www.lead-journal.org/content/09167.pdf (“During the 1970s 
and 1980s, an increasing awareness of the negative impacts of hazardous waste on human health and 
the environment led to a proliferation of legislation relating to waste disposal in the domestic legal 
regimes of developed countries.”). 
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location of disposal sites for unwanted wastes, particularly those classified 
as hazardous, and the appreciable increase in disposal costs for these types 
of wastes.2  The advent of global trade combined with these two factors 
helped push waste traders to seek cheap dumping sites around the world. 
Toxic waste dumping from developed to poorer countries became a 
major concern, due in part to highly publicized dumping cases.  The case of 
the Khian Sea, a barge transporting 14,000 tons of incinerator ash from 
Pennsylvania that was refused entry to New Jersey, was one of the leading 
cases in the 1980s.3  
Another highly publicized case was the Koko Beach incident in 1987 
wherein an Italian businessman, illegally exported 4,000 tonnes of 
chemical waste (including 150 tons of polychlorinated biphenyl) from Italy 
to Nigeria over an 18-month period resulting in the loss of lives and 
environmental damage in the area.4 
The logic of the waste export paradigm that defined the period was 
given a voice by then World Bank Chief Economist Larry Summers, when 
he issued an internal memo to his colleagues, stating that “the economic 
logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is 
impeccable. . . .”5 Mr. Summers defended his logic in the following 
manner: 
 
1) The measurement of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the 
foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality.  From this point 
of view a given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the 
country with lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest 
wages. . . . 
 
 2.  History of the Negotiations of the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/Overview/History/Overview/tabid/3405/Default.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2014) [hereinafter History of Basel Convention].  
 3.  When New Jersey authorities learned that the waste contained arsenic, cadmium, lead, 
mercury, dioxin, and other toxins and was classified as hazardous waste, the Khian Sea’s entry was 
refused.  ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), TRADE 
MEASURES IN THE BASEL CONVENTION ON THE CONTROL OF TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL 5 (May 27, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/ 
trade/envtrade/36789048.pdf.  The vessel attempted to dock and unload its toxic cargo in six other 
countries and was refused. Id. The barge then sailed to sea from 1984 to 1986, stopping at various 
Caribbean ports failing to offload its cargo, before finally leaving some of its wastes cargo in Haiti, 
with the rest assumed to have been dumped at sea. Id.; Peter Montague, Philadelphia Dumps on the 
Poor, ENVTL. RES. FOUND., http://ban.org/ ban_news/philly_dumps.html. 
 4.  See Edna Eguh, Regulations of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes: Lessons 
from Koko, 9 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 130, 130–32 (1997) (describing Koko incident and its 
consequences). 
 5.  Internal Memorandum from Larry Summers at World Bank (Dec. 12, 1991), available at 
http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/document/ec47401/6865.pdf. 
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2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments 
of pollution probably have very low cost.  I’ve always though that under-
populated countries in Africa are vastly under-polluted, their air quality is 
probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico 
City. . . . 
3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is 
likely to have a very high-income elasticity.6 
 
The undercurrent of Summers’ logic is the recognition of inequalities 
in the world and to take full advantage of them.  In the realm of toxic waste 
trade, there was and continues a clear divide between developed and poorer 
countries from environmental and labor standards to technical capacity and 
other social elements. 
In the 1970’s and the decades following, only a handful of 
industrialized or developed countries produce 95% of the world’s toxic 
wastes.7  Much of the toxic waste trade occurs among developed countries, 
where the waste originated. However, significant portion of the trade have 
found their way to developing countries.8  Thus, the Khian Sea, Koko 
Beach, and similar toxic waste dumping cases echoed the inequalities faced 
by poorer countries and the growing threat of toxic waste in the global 
environment. 
The experience of poorer countries with respect to toxic waste 
dumping was happening in conjunction with the experience of poor 
communities and people of color in the US.  It was during this period that 
the environmental justice movement emerged in the US, which was 
“started by individuals, primarily people of color, who sought to address 
the inequity of environmental protection in their communities.”9 
The environmental justice movement in the US can be seen as an 
important milestone in the development of international environmental 
justice as the movement and the principle shared common themes and 
struggles.10  And as Lawrence Summers’ remarks defined the economic 
logic of toxic waste dumping, the environmental justice movement in the 
US helped contribute in defining the environmental justice principle at the 
 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  JENNIFER CLAPP, TOXIC EXPORTS:  THE TRANSFER OF HAZARDOUS WASTES FROM RICH TO 
POOR COUNTRIES 22 (2001).  
 8.  Id. at 2. 
 9.  Basic information on Environmental Justice, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/environmental 
justice/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).  
 10.  Cf. RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH 
DIMENSION 15 (2004) (analogizing the United States and international environmental justice 
movements). 
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international level. 
In 1994, the principle of environmental justice was institutionalized in 
the US when President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 (EO).11 
According to the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
environmental justice is “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of 
all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect 
to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, and policies.”12 
The EPA’s definition encompasses two sets of action: fair treatment 
and meaningful involvement. 
“Fair treatment means that no group of people should bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences 
resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or 
policies. Meaningful involvement means that: (1) people have an 
opportunity to participate in decisions about activities that may affect their 
environment and/or health; (2) the publics [sic] contribution can influence 
the regulatory agency’s decision; (3) their concerns will be considered in 
the decision making process; and (4) the decision makers seek out and 
facilitate the involvement of those potentially affected.”13 
Other authors describe these two elements as: distributive justice and 
procedural justice.14  Distributive justice deals with “inequitable 
distribution of social, economic, and political burdens on 
people/communities with different levels of development.”15 Procedural 
justice highlights the “inequitable bargaining powers of 
people/communities with different levels of economic development,” 
regarding environmental benefits and burdens, and recognizes that racial 
minorities and the poor are often not included or are ignored in such 
conversations.16 
In spite of the difference in terminologies, these very principles have 
found their way at the global level, particularly in international multilateral 
agreements, such as the Basel Convention.17 
 
 11.  Exec. Order. No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
 12.  EPA, supra note 9. 
 13.  Id. (emphasis removed).  
 14.  Lisa Widawsky, In My Backyard: How Enabling Hazardous Waste Trade To Developing 
Nations Can Improve the Basel Convention’s Ability to Achieve Environmental Justice, 38 ENVTL. L. 
577, 583 (2008). 
 15.  ANAND, supra note 10, at 10. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Widawsky, supra note 14, at 585 (“Examples of procedural and distributive injustice 
pervade the discourse among industrialized and developing nations, and political solutions in the form 
of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) echoing the themes of environmental justice and 
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I. THE BASEL CONVENTION AND THE BASEL BAN 
 
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements 
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal18 (Basel Convention) was initiated 
in response to the numerous international scandals regarding hazardous 
waste trafficking in the 1980s.19 
The Basel Convention negotiations were “politicized, arduous and 
emotionally charged.”20  In the tense negotiations the undercurrent of 
environmental justice was present as two competing ideologies vied for 
control of the direction of the Convention: the pro-trade camp and those 
calling for a total ban on toxic waste exports. Developed countries, Japan, 
US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, known as the JUSCANZ, with 
their developing country allies, led the pro-trade side.  On the other, the 
Group of 77 developing countries led by China, and supported by the 
European Union bloc of countries fought for an outright ban. 
The negotiations started in 1987 and concluded on March 22, 1989 
with 35 states signing the Convention in Basel, Switzerland.21  To date, 181 
countries have ratified the treaty.22 
 
A. Basel Convention 
 
 1. The Convention’s Framework. The Basel Convention seeks to 
minimize the generation23 and exportation of hazardous wastes,24 and to 
promote national self-sufficiency in hazardous waste management by 
placing responsibility on toxic waste generators to dispose of the wastes as 
close to area of generation as possible.25  In its efforts at minimizing waste 
exports, the Basel Convention also restricts traffic in toxic wastes by 
 
attempting to rectify these injustices have been forged.”). 
 18.  Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Basel Convention], available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/05/19920505%2012-51%20PM/Ch_XXVII_03p.pdf.  
 19.  History of Basel Convention, supra note 2. 
 20.  Katharina Kummer, The Basel Convention: Ten Years On, 7 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L 
ENVL. L. 227, 227 (1998).  
 21.  For a full list of signatories, see Parties to the Basel Convention, BASEL CONVENTION, 
http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/Parties/tabid/1290/ Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 
17, 2014) [hereinafter Signatories to Basel Convention]. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(a).  
 24.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(d).  
 25.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4(2)(b) and 4(10). 
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applying the “Prior Informed Consent” or PIC procedure,26 and prohibiting 
waste trade with countries not parties to the Basel Convention.27  
Shipments made without the proper notification and consent of the 
importing Party or when the shipment does not conform in a material way 
with the shipping documents, are deemed illegal.28  Illegal traffic under the 
Basel Convention is a criminal act.29 
It is important to note that the Basel Convention framework only 
applies to toxic and other wastes.30  Waste is defined by the Convention as 
“any substances or objects which are disposed of or are intended to be 
disposed of or are required to be disposed of by the provisions of national 
law.”31  The Basel Convention is unique because it defines wastes without 
considering economic value or use of the substance and places emphasis on 
the fact of disposal or intent to dispose of the substance.  Disposal is 
defined in Annex IV of the Convention and includes recycling, 
reclamation, and other processes.32 
Elements of distributive justice and procedural justice are present in 
the Basel Convention.  The PIC procedure on the importation of waste is 
an important element of procedural justice, as it allows countries, 
regardless of economic stature, to be notified and consent to or reject any 
toxic waste importation or exportation.  Other procedural justice elements 
that are found in Basel are: 
 
 Information sharing provisions33 and a mandate for 
cooperation34 – countries are mandated to cooperate in 
monitoring the management of hazardous wastes35 and in 
developing technical guidelines and codes of practice for 
environmentally sound management of wastes, 36 send 
 
 26.  See Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 6 (establishing prior informed consent 
requirement). 
 27.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(5). 
 28.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 9(1). 
 29.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(3). 
 30.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 1. 
 31.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(1).  
 32.  Wastes are considered toxic under Basel if it is included in a category of waste under Annex I 
of the Convention, e.g. clinical wastes. Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 1(1)(a).  If the suspected 
waste, however, is found in Annex I, but does not exhibit a specific characteristic that the Parties to the 
Convention deemed hazardous, as listed in Annex III, e.g. poisonous, flammable solids, then that waste 
is not considered hazardous. Id. art. 1(1)(b).  
 33.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13.  
 34.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 10. 
 35.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 10(b).  
 36.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 10(e). 
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information on their national definitions of wastes37, decisions 
to ban or limit entry of hazardous wastes38, among other 
information. 
 Participation at Conference of Parties (COP) and allowing 
observers.39  Developing countries are able participate in COP 
adding their voice in strengthening and developing the 
Convention.  To accomplish this the Convention has created a 
provision where financial support is given to developing 
countries to attend and participate.40  Notably, the Convention 
also makes room for non-parties and non-state parties, such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), industry, and other 
stakeholders to participate as observers under specific rules.41 
 The right to vote42 – regardless of economic status, countries 
party to the Convention has 1 vote and decisions by the 
Convention pass by consensus.43 
 
On distributive justice, the obligation to manage a country’s own toxic 
waste within its own border,44 the explicit recognition of disparity between 
developed and developing countries45 are some of the indicators of the 
Convention’s consciousness of the plight of developing countries.  To 
further minimize the disproportionate impact of waste dumping on 
developing countries, the Basel Convention further installed measures such 
as the criminalization of illegal trade in hazardous wastes,46 and provisions 
of transfer of technology to developing countries through centers called 
Basel Convention Regional Centers.47 
 
 2. Weaknesses of the Basel Convention. For NGOs and the developing 
countries that fought for a trade ban, the resulting treaty was a failure. 
Instead of establishing an outright toxic waste ban, the Basel Convention 
was seen as a means of legalizing toxic waste trade.48  “Thus the original 
 
 37.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(2)(b). 
 38.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(2)(d). 
 39.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 15. 
 40.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 15 (3). 
 41.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 15(6). 
 42.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 24. 
 43.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 24(1). 
 44.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(b). 
 45.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, pmbl. ¶ 20. 
 46.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, arts. 4(3), 9(1). 
 47.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 14(1). 
 48.  BASEL ACTION NETWORK, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 1: THE BASEL BAN A TRIUMPH FOR GLOBAL 
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Convention became primarily an instrument to monitor the transboundary 
movements of hazardous waste rather than prevent it. With the exception 
of a ban on exports to Antarctica, the Convention established only a weak 
control regime based on the principle of PIC.”49 
  i. Gaps in the PIC procedure. As the core measure of control under 
the Basel Convention, the PIC procedure has three critical weaknesses that 
have raised concerns over Basel’s effectiveness in minimizing toxic waste 
dumping.  First, the PIC procedure fundamentally fails to ensure that the 
exporting country verifies that the facility accepting the waste in the 
importing country can manage the waste in an environmentally sound 
manner.50  Under the Convention each party has the obligation to ensure 
the availability of adequate disposal facilities in the importing state.51  
However, the obligation does not prescribe a process nor designate an 
entity that will conduct the verification.  The Convention thus relies on 
self-verification by countries and without any standard process or 
independent entity to conduct the verification, the adequacy of sufficiently 
determining if a facility is environmentally sound is difficult to achieve. 
Compounding the lack of a prescribed process is the fact that the 
technical guidelines generated under the Convention are not mandatory at 
the local or national levels. The guidelines are merely prescriptive of 
environmentally sound management (ESM) technologies and processes, 
and Basel parties have the discretion to adopt these ESM guidelines.  Thus, 
in the absence of a standard process for verification, a country attempting 
to self-verify a facility cannot assume that the destination country is 
observing the Basel ESM guidelines for a specific waste. 
Another weakness in the PIC procedure is its omission to account for 
the susceptibility of country consents to be obtained from corrupt local 
officials.52 It also ignores the economic motivation of poor countries to 
accept these types of wastes for either the value or money that the waste 
can contribute to the local economy.53 
ii. Recycling Loophole. The “Recycling Loophole” is based on Article 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2012), available at http://ban.org/library/briefing1.html [hereinafter BAN 
NO. 1]. 
 49.  Jim Puckett, The Basel Ban: A Triumph Over Business-As-Usual, BASEL ACTION NETWORK 
(last updated Oct. 1, 1997), available at http://ban.org/about_basel_ban /jims_article.html. 
 50.  See Widawsky, supra note 14, at 582 (“[T]he loophole in the PIC process currently enabling 
misrepresentation by Parties regarding [environmentally sound management] practices could be closed 
by predicating use of a facility in a developing nation upon prior inspection and authorization by an 
implementation body.”). 
 51.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 4(2)(b).  
 52.  Andrews, supra note 1, at 173. 
 53.  Id. at 173–74.  
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4(9)(b) of the Basel Convention which allows transboundary movement of 
wastes if these are required as a raw material for recycling or recovery 
industries in the importing state.  There was a concern among NGOs and 
developing countries that waste trade will follow the recycling loophole 
under the Convention.  The international environmental group, 
Greenpeace, reported that by early 1990s after the Convention entered into 
force, 90% of waste destined for final disposal shifted instead and headed 
to recycling or further use.54  The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) also cited an increase in their member countries 
waste export for recycling, from 50.2% in 1992 to 58.4% in 1993.55 
The Basel Action Network, a Basel Convention NGO watchdog, 
classifies the waste trade recycling practices either as: sham – “where 
wastes are not really recycled at all, but simply burned or dumped,” or dirty 
– “which involves polluting operations that jeopardize the health of the 
importing country’s populace and environment.”56  In 2002, the group 
publicized its investigation on the sham or dirty recycling of electronic 
waste or e-waste from the US to China.57  Other civil society groups have 
also documented egregious recycling practices over the years, including the 
disposal of ships that are have reached the end of their useful life or have 
been mandated by law to be decommissioned, or end-of-life vessels.58 
iii. Environmentally Sound Management. Environmentally sound 
management is a critical principle in the Basel Convention framework, as it 
functions as both a goal and obligation by parties to the Convention. The 
Basel Convention defines environmentally sound management as “taking 
all practicable steps to ensure that hazardous wastes or other wastes are 
managed in a manner which will protect human health and the environment 
against the adverse effects which may result from such wastes.”59 
This definition has been criticized as vague and open to subjective 
interpretations and has been seen as one of the reasons for the difficulty of 
enforcing the obligation of parties that wastes can be exported only if 
 
 54.  CLAPP, supra note 7, at 58 (footnotes omitted). 
 55.  Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 56.  BASEL ACTION NETWORK, HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING: NO JUSTIFICATION FOR TOXIC 
TRADE 1 (2011), available at http://www.ban.org/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/10/BP7_Oct_2011_Final_Letter.pdf. 
 57.  BASEL ACTION NETWORK & SILICON VALLEY TOXICS COALITION, EXPORTING HARM: THE 
HIGH-TECH TRASHING OF ASIA (2002), available at http://www.ban.org/E-
waste/technotrashfinalcomp.pdf. 
 58. Problems and Solutions, NGO SHIPBREAKING PLATFORM, http://www.shipbreakingplatform. 
org/problems-and-solutions/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
 59.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 2(8). 
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disposed of in an “environmentally sound manner”.60 
The subjectivity of the ESM definition is also seen as a means of 
stripping the Basel Convention of its environmental justice roots.61  Some 
sectors are defining ESM “only in terms of technical capacity and only at 
the facility level, and does not embody the fundamental Basel policies, 
such as the fact that waste generation should be minimized and that it is not 
ESM to externalize costs of pollution via export to poorer countries rather 
than deal with them at source through national self-sufficiency.”62 
iv. Liability Protocol in Limbo. Another weakness that has been 
attributed to the Basel Convention is its lack of provision for liability and 
compensation for toxic waste contamination.63  The closest response by the 
Basel Parties was to develop the Protocol on Liability and Compensation 
(Protocol),64 which was adopted in December of 1999.  Fifteen years after 
its adoption it is not yet in force, and has garnered only 11 of 20 needed 
ratifications. 
The Protocol covers damages arising from incidents occurring “during 
a transboundary movement of hazardous wastes and other wastes and their 
disposal, including illegal traffic, from the point where the wastes are 
loaded on the means of transport in an area under the national jurisdiction 
of a State of export.” 65  Damages under the Protocol include: loss of life or 
personal injury, loss of or damage to property, loss of income, costs of 
reinstatement and preventive measures.66 
The main strengths of the Protocol are the strict liability and fault-
based liability provisions it has set up for waste shipments. Under the strict 
liability provisions liability for damages is generally assigned to the state of 
export or exporter, and to the state of import in specific cases, arising from 
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes until the disposer has 
taken possession of the waste, at which point the disposer will be held 
liable.67 The fault-based liability element of the Protocol applies to any 
person who causes or contributes to an accident by ignoring Basel 
 
 60.  CLAPP, supra note 7, at 57. 
 61.  BASEL ACTION NETWORK, RUNNING FROM BASEL: HOW THE CONVENTION IS DELIBERATELY 
UNDERMINED 1 (2012), available at http://www.ban.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/BP8_Sept2012 
Final_A4.pdf. 
 62.  Id. at 2.  
 63.  CLAPP, supra note 7, at 57. 
 64.  Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Dec. 10, 1999, UNEP/CHW.1/WG/1/9/2, 
available at http://archive.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/docs /prot-e.pdf. 
 65.  Id. art. 3(1). 
 66.  Id. art. 2(2)(c). 
 67.  Id. art. 4(1),(2). 
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Convention requirements or through wrongful intentional, reckless, or 
negligent acts will be held liable for damages.68 
Developed and developing countries, including NGOs, have been 
lukewarm in accepting the Protocol. A reason for this is that the, liability 
for the shipment will not cover so-called “after-care incidences” such as 
leaks or seepage at waste storage sites.69  Major costs of clean-up and 
remediation are borne by the State of import. For developing countries who 
are often at the receiving end of toxic waste exports this is an unwanted 
economic and technical burden. Depending on the hazards involved, the 
technical capacity of cleaning up and remediating the hazards might not be 
available in the country. In these cases, developing countries often seek out 
developed country assistance. 
Another downside of the Protocol is the exclusion of waste generators 
from the strict liability provisions. The exclusion is seen as an incentive for 
waste exporters to hand over their waste to export brokers or other 
“notifiers” who would assume liability for the shipments who could easily 
escape or minimize liability.70  For instance, the “notifier” assuming the 
liability of the waste export may be under capitalized which will 
immediately limit its exposure to pay out any claims for damage arising 
from any incident. 
Developed nations, particularly the US, were uncomfortable with the 
Protocol primarily on the provisions for minimum liability thresholds 
imposing a high limit, which could impact trade in nondangerous 
recyclable wastes.71 
 
B. The Basel Ban Amendment (the Basel Ban) 
The increase in toxic waste exports after the adoption of the Basel 
Convention, and the emergence of the loopholes in the Convention, pressed 
both developing countries and environmental NGOs to call for a trade ban 
on hazardous wastes outside of the Convention.72  As a result, several 
regional agreements were born at the wake of the Convention: Lomé IV 
Convention in 1989,73 Bamako Convention in 1991,74 Agreement on the 
 
 68.  Id. art. 5. 
 69.  Saving the Basel Liability Protocol, BASEL ACTION NETWORK, at II, 
http://ban.org/subsidiary/liability10.html. 
 70.  Id. at I.  
 71.  Daniel Pruzin, Hazardous Waste agreement on Liability Protocol Reached at Basel 
Conference of Parties, 22 INT’L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 973 (Dec. 8, 1999), available at 
www.ban.org/ban_news/hazardous3.html.  
 72.  CLAPP, supra note 7, at 67. 
 73.  Forth ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 385, available at http://unctad.org 
/Sections/dite/iia/docs/compendium/en/44%20volume%202.pdf. 
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Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes in the Central American 
Region 1992,75 Waigani Convention in 1995,76 and Izmir Protocol in 
1996.77 
Within the Basel Convention, efforts to push for trade bans continued 
as well.  At the first Conference of Parties in Piriapolis, Uruguay on 
December 1992, Decision I/22 was adopted requesting developing 
countries to prohibit the import of hazardous wastes from industrialized 
countries.78 
In March 1994, at COP2, a tense and political contest between 
JUSCANZ and the G-77 with the EU countries resulted in Decision II/12.79  
This decision explicitly prohibited export of all hazardous wastes from 
OECD to non-OECD countries including exports for recycling ore 
recovery operations as of January 1, 1998.80  Decision II/12 attempted to 
address a major loophole under Basel and was a major assertion of both 
procedural and distributive justice by developing countries at the global 
stage. 
Decision II/12, however, gave rise to further questions, particularly 
involving its legal status and enforceability paving the way for another 
showdown between JUSCANZ and the G-77 and EU in COP3. 
In September 1995, COP3 of the Basel Convention was held in 
Geneva, Switzerland.  The contest between JUSCANZ and G-77 and the 
EU was coming to a head.  Both sides understood the level of importance 
of what was to be decided at COP3 that in order for Decision II/12, which 
 
 74.  Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import to Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, Jan. 31, 1991,  2101 U.N.T.S. 177, 
available at http://www.cetim.ch/en/documents/conv-bamako-ang.pdf. 
 75.  Regional Agreement on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, Dec. 11, 1992, 
available at http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails ?id=TRE-001167&index=treaties. 
 76.  Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and 
Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous 
Wastes within the South Pacific Region, Sept. 16, 1995, 2161 U.N.T.S. 91, available at 
http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Waigani%20Convention%20 
Text.pdf. 
 77.  Protocol on the Prevention of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Jan. 10, 1996, available at 
http://www.unep.ch/regionalseas/main/med/medhaz.html. 
 78.  First Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Piriapolis, Uru., Dec. 3–4, 1992, 
Decision I/22, 37-38, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.1/24, available at http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/ 
ConferenceoftheParties/ReportsandDecisions/tabid/3303/Default.aspx. 
 79.  Second Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Geneva, Switz., Mar. 21–25, 
1994, Decision II/12, 19-20, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.2/30, available at http://www.basel.int/The 
Convention/ConferenceoftheParties/ReportsandDecisions/tabid /3303/Default.aspx. 
 80.  Id. §§ 1–2. 
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has been restated in Decision III/1,81 to be implemented it had to become 
integral to the Convention.  Thus, amending the Basel Convention was 
necessary. 
At the end of the highly contentious meeting, the political tight rope 
was crossed.  The G-77 nations prevailed and Decision III/1 or what has 
come to be known as the Basel Ban was adopted by consensus.82 
 
1. The Basel Ban’s Framework. Decision III/1 or the Basel Ban 
prohibits Annex VII countries (nations that are part of the OECD, 
European Community, and the special mention of Liechtenstein) from 
exporting hazardous wastes to non-Annex VII countries for final disposal 
and for wastes intended for recycling or recovery.83 
In addition to the prevention of waste dumping on poorer countries, 
the Basel Ban is also designed to bolster the Basel Convention’s goal of 
minimizing toxic waste generation. 84The Basel Ban attempts to 
accomplish this by preventing the movement of waste, forcing waste 
generating countries to increase their self-sufficiency in managing their 
waste, which includes minimizing toxic inputs in production and 
processes.85 
The Basel Ban has several key features in relation to international 
environmental justice. 
First the Basel Ban attempted to further embed within the treaty the 
principle of distributive justice by adding a new preambular paragraph to 
the Basel Convention, confirming the inequality between rich and poorer 
nations on the issue of hazardous waste management.  The proposed 
amendment states: 
“Recognizing that transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, 
especially to developing countries, have a high risk of not constituting an 
environmentally sound management of hazardous wastes as required by 
this Convention;” 
Second, considering the fact that in that period at least 95% of the 
 
 81.  Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Geneva, Switz., Sept. 18–22, 
1995, Decision III/1, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CHW.3/35,  available at http://www.basel.int/Implementation/ 
LegalMatters/BanAmendment/tabid/1484/Default.aspx [hereinafter Basel Ban]. 
 82.  Note at the meeting India, Brazil, South Korea, and Russia sided with the JUSCANZ.  See 
CLAPP, supra note 7, at 76 (“[F]or the first time, some non-OECD governments, including those of 
Brazil, India, Russia, and South Korea, also expressed opposition to the adoption of a ban 
amendment.”).  
 83.   Basel Ban, supra note 81, § 3. 
 84.  BAN NO.1, supra note 48. 
 85.  See id. 
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waste trade generators were from rich nations, the developing country 
proponents and their NGO allies tried to further concretize the 
differentiation of roles between richer and poorer nations by creating the 
category of Annex VII and non-Annex VII countries. 
Third, the fact that Decision III/1 was even possible and passed 
through the Basel proceedings, in spite of strong resistance from several 
developed nations such as the US and Japan, affirmed that the procedural 
justice component of the Basel Convention is functioning. 
 
2. Major Weaknesses of the Basel Ban. The Basel Ban has received its 
fair share of criticisms. These can be grouped into three categories: trade, 
development, and implementation. 
The trade argument against the Basel Ban rests on two planks: a) that 
it is inconsistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
/ World Trade Organization (WTO) rules; and b) legitimate trade on 
recyclable materials will be controlled as hazardous waste potentially 
stifling the trade.86 
Another major argument against the Basel Ban is that it impinges on a 
country’s national development by restricting needed supply of raw 
materials and source of income, especially for developing countries.  By 
denying access to raw materials or from foreign sources, developing 
country facilities could eventually close down and the valuable materials in 
the hazardous wastes would end up in final disposal.87  Put another way, 
this argument posits that a ban on recycling hazardous wastes will 
discourage recycling and result in more use of virgin materials thus 
creating more environmental damage.  Corollary to the national 
development argument is the loss of jobs and earnings from the affected 
recycling sector. 
The lack of support from developed countries, particularly the non-
European developed nations: US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Korea is cited as a critical weakness of the Basel Ban.  “Any 
measure that does not bind such an important group of countries is of 
limited value.”88 
 
3. The Country Led Initiative (CLI). The competing interests over the 
Basel Ban Amendment defined the agenda of work of the Basel 
 
 86.  CLAPP, supra note 7, at 83; see also Widawsky, supra note 14, at 614. 
 87.  See Widawsky, supra note 14, at 614 (noting that “reclamation not only provides income for 
these countries but also puts materials into use that would otherwise be sitting at a disposal site”). 
 88.  Andrews, supra note 1, at 180. 
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Convention and it often ended up in a political and legal deadlock.  A 
procedural hump that further complicated the Basel Ban issue was the 
vagueness of the Basel Convention on how it should be amended. 89  
Article 17(5) of the Convention on amendments was not clear, particularly 
the numerical basis of the three-fourth’s voting requirement.  The 
interpretation of Article 17(5) has a direct bearing on the number of votes 
needed before an amendment could come into force.90  Thus, in addition to 
overcoming the challenge of getting the needed ratification, the parties to 
the Convention had to agree on the process of resolving the issue and what 
the correct interpretation of the Article 17(5) provision should be while 
navigating the political minefield that has permeated the Basel Ban 
debates. 
In 2008, at Bali, Indonesia, the President of the ninth meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, called for a process to 
explore means to break the impasse to finally move the Basel Ban 
objectives forward.91 
In response to the call, Indonesia and Switzerland organized the effort 
called “Country-Led Initiative” (CLI), where they invited key countries, to 
discuss in an informal, dynamic and non-dogmatic manner those issues 
related to the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially to 
developing countries, contrary to the overarching objective of the Basel 
Ban.92 
 
 89.  See Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 17(5).  
 90.  See Basel Convention Amendments – History, Basel Convention,  http://www.basel.int/ 
Default.aspx?tabid=2760#section2 (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that ambiguity arises in 
determining the particular percentage of votes needed to ratify or amend and that “‘it is necessary to be 
aware of the total number of States concerned from which the required percentage will be calculated’”).  
There were two competing interpretations on Art. 17(5).  The first interpretation was called the “fixed 
time” approach.  Id. This interpretation considers the number of parties present and voting in 1995 
when the Basel Ban Amendment was adopted.  Id.  The main disagreement in this interpretation was 
whether the actual number of parties present at the time of the adoption or the total number of parties to 
the Basel Convention in 1995 would be the basis.  See id. (“It is only when a treaty specifies that the 
percentage should be calculated based upon the number of parties at the time of adoption of an 
amendment that the depositary, in compliance with the treaty itself, can adopt the ‘fixed time 
approach.’ . . . [However,] [i]n the present case, article 17(5) of the Convention does not specify that 
the percentages should be calculated at the time of adoption . . . .”).  The other line of interpretation was 
from the UN Office of Legal Affairs, which utilized the “current time” approach.  Id.  This approach 
stipulates that the number of ratifications required for entry into force will be calculated on the basis of 
the percentage of the Parties at the time each ratification is deposited.  Id.  
 91.  See Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its Ninth Meeting, Bali, Indon., June 23–27, 
2008, 51–52 U.N. DOC. UNEP/CHW.9/39, available at  http://www.basel.int/Portals/ 
4/Basel%20Convention/docs/meetings/cop/cop9/docs/39e-rep.pdf#ix26 (reproducing the “President’s 
statement on the possible way forward on the Ban Amendment”). 
 92.  Basel Convention Implementation – The Country-Led Initiative, BASEL CONVENTION, 
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A key output from the CLI was a draft omnibus decision that became 
the basis for Decision 10/3,93 which was adopted as a decision at the tenth 
meeting of the Conference of the Parties in 2011.94 
Decision 10/3 interpreted Article 17(5) stating that: 
 
[A]cceptance of three-fourths of those parties that were parties at the 
time of the adoption of the amendment is required for the entry into force 
of such amendment, noting that such an interpretation of paragraph 5 of 
Article 17 does not compel any party to ratify the Ban Amendment.95 
 
With the Basel parties resolving the roadblock to ratification, the CLI 
effort led to 7 country ratifications 3 years since its passage.96  The 
adoption of the “fixed time” approach at COP 10 means that 66 countries 
are needed to ratify the Basel Ban for it to enter into force, and as of this 
writing, it is 16 ratifications away.97 
 
II. THE BASEL BAN IN 2014: FROM A PHILIPPINE PERSPECTIVE 
 
As the Basel Ban moves closer to its entry into force, it is critical to 
 
http://www.basel.int/Implementation/LegalMatters/CountryLedInitiative/tabid/1339/Default.aspx#Live
Content[decision10-3] (last visited Feb. 21, 2014).  
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal on its Tenth Meeting, Cartagena, Colom., Oct. 17–
21, 2011, 31, U.N. DOC. UNEP/CHW.10/28 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://archive.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop10/documents/28e.pdf (emphasis added). 
 96.  See Basel Convention - Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal Geneva, 22 September 1995, 
BASEL CONVENTION, http://www.basel.int/Countries/StatusofRatifications/Ban Amendment/tabid/ 
1344/Default.aspx (last visited April. 19, 2014). The following countries submitted their instruments of 
accession, acceptance or ratification after Nov. 1, 2011: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guatemala, Lesotho, 
Malta, Monaco, and Saudi Arabia.  
 97.  There were 87 parties to the Basel Convention in 1995 when the Basel Ban was adopted. 
Following the fixed-time approach, three-fourths of those 87 parties, 66, would need to ratify the Basel 
Ban in order for it to enter into force. See at: file:///Users/Rich/Downloads/UNEP-CHW-BAN-OLA-
DepositaryLetter19032013.Engl ish.pdf (last visited April 19, 2014). The following are the prospective 
countries that have not yet ratified the Basel Ban Amendment, and whose ratification counts toward the 
Amendment entering into force:  Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Canada, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Dem. Rep. of Congo, El Salvador, Estonia, Guinea, 
India, Iran, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Malawi, Maldives, Mexico, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Senegal, Seychelles, St. Kitt and Nevis, South 
Africa, United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. See id. This list is based on the comparison of the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs 1995 list of countries and the current ratification lists under the Basel 
Convention.(highlighting those countries who have yet to ratify the Basel Ban).  
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revisit the Basel Ban in the reality that faces developing countries to 
understand the arguments raised against it that could dissuade the 
Philippines and other countries from ratifying an international instrument 
whose main purpose is to prevent toxic waste dumping on poorer nations. 
 
A. The Philippines 
The Philippines is a representative country for developing nations on 
the issue of the Basel Ban.  It shares similarities with other developing 
countries, for instance, with a population surpassing 105 million, 26.5% of 
it population is under the poverty line, it ranks 54th among highly indebted 
nations, and 51.5% of its GDP goes into servicing its foreign debt.98  The 
Philippine public sector is highly perceived as corrupt.  In 2013, the 
Philippines ranked 94th with a score of 36, from a corruption ranking 
issued by the international NGO, Transparency International, which scores 
countries from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (no corruption).99 
On the issue of toxic waste, the Philippines became a party to the 
Convention on March 10, 1993.  It has not ratified the Basel Ban.  The 
country has also experienced illegal toxic waste shipments and toxic 
exports.  In 1994, a Japanese shipbuilding company developed an industrial 
zone in Southern Philippines to dismantle end-of-life vessels contaminated 
with toxins, with no effective measures to prevent pollution.100 In 1999, 
Philippine authorities in the Port of Manila intercepted 124 seagoing 
containers of medical waste, in the guise of recycled paper, from Japan.101 
The Philippines also has a special connection with the Basel Ban.  
First, it is one of the countries that belong to the 1995 list of parties to the 
Basel Convention whose ratification is crucial in bringing the Basel Ban 
into force.  Second, Philippine lawmakers were outraged over the growing 
toxic waste trade, which they called a “diabolical practice” that they 
responded unilaterally by passing a law banning the import, storage, or 
transport of nuclear or toxic wastes in or through the Philippines.102  And 
 
 98.  The World Factbook – Philippines, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2014). 
 99.  Corruption by Country/Territory, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,   http://www.trans 
parency.org/country#PHL (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). Compared to its Southeast Asian neighbors, the 
Philippines would be in middle of the pack with Singapore being the least corrupt with a rank of 5th 
followed by Brunei (38th) and Malaysia (53th) but it is ahead of Thailand (102nd), Indonesia (114th), 
Vietnam (116th), Laos (140th) Myanmar (157th), and Cambodia (160th). 
 100.  BASEL ACTION NETWORK, JPEPA AS A STEP IN JAPAN’S GREATER PLAN TO LIBERALIZE 
HAZARDOUS WASTE TRADE IN ASIA 9 (2007), available at http://ban.org/library/JPEPA_ 
Report_BAN_FINAL_29_Aug_071.pdf.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY, 1990; see also An Act 
to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations 
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third, the country’s importation from Australia of used lead acid batteries 
as raw materials for its facility has oft been cited as an example of why the 
Basel Ban can adversely impact local recycling industries in developing 
countries. 
In the succeeding section, we will look at the Philippine situation and 
examine whether the weaknesses or faults attributed to the Basel Ban has 
and continues to impact the prospects of the country ratifying the Basel 
Ban. 
 
B. Obstacles to Ratifying the Basel Ban 
1. Anti-Trade Measure. The “anti-trade” measure argument against 
the Basel Ban must be seen in light of the WTO principles and agreements.  
A fundamental principle that the WTO members follow is that countries 
must facilitate free trade by removing both tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade.103 
Specifically, GATT Article XI(1) requires its members not to employ 
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes, or other charges on the 
importation of any product from another member country or on the 
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of 
another member.  This is a clear proscription against the practice of export 
and import bans on industrial goods.  The Philippines became part of the 
WTO in January 1, 1995. 
Considering GATT Article XI(1), the Basel Ban is indeed a measure 
to restrict or control trade, particularly for hazardous wastes. 
The fact that a measure can indeed be characterized as or contain 
provisions that could be construed as “anti-trade” did not dissuade the 
Philippine government from ratifying multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) with such elements. 
On July 17, 1991, four years before the Basel Ban, the Philippines 
ratified the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer 
(Montreal Protocol).104  The Montreal Protocol is a landmark international 
 
Thereof, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 6969, § 13, (Oct. 26, 1990) (Phil.), available at 
http://www.pctc.gov.ph/initiatv/RepAct6969.htm. 
 103.  See Understanding the WTO: Basics – Principles of the Trading System, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) 
(“Lowering trade barriers is one of the most obvious means of encouraging trade.”).  
 104.  See generally Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume% 
201522/volume-1522-I-26369-English.pdf [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; Status of Ratification for 
the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, (Nov. 12, 2013), 
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/treaty_ratification_status.php.  Note that The Vienna Convention on 
Protection of Ozone Layer (1985) established the framework for the creation of the Montreal Protocol.  
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agreement designed to protect the stratospheric ozone layer.  The Protocol 
requires each party to ratchet-down its respective production and 
consumption of Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS) following the time 
frame stated in the Protocol, with the ultimate goal of global elimination of 
ODS.105  The Protocol also requires all Parties to ban exports and imports 
of controlled substances from and to non-Parties.106 
On February 27, 2004, 9 years after the Basel Ban, the Philippines 
ratified the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs 
Convention).107  The POPs Convention was designed to end the production 
and use of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). 
The Convention has specific “anti-trade” provisions as it restricts 
export and import of POPs and POPs’ wastes.108 The Convention also 
defines how the international community must manage POPs wastes, 
particularly the need to take appropriate measures so that these wastes are, 
disposed of in such a way that the POPs pollutant content is “destroyed or 
irreversibly transformed” so that it no longer possesses the characteristics 
of a POP. 
At the WTO level there is room for even the “anti-trade” measures 
under the Montreal Protocol and POPs Convention.  The WTO recognizes 
that the principle of free trade is not absolute and is limited by a country’s 
need to protect human health and the environment. This is embodied in the 
chapeau of Article XX and in subparagraph (b) of GATT 1994, which 
provides: 
 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any 
contracting party of measures: 
 
The Montreal Protocol, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_ 
protocol.php.  The Protocol has been modified five times since its adoption in 1987 by subsequent 
agreements in London (1990), Copenhagen (1992), Vienna (1995), Montreal (1997), and Beijing 
(1999).  Id.  The Philippines has ratified all the modifications.  Id.  
 105.  See Montreal Protocol, supra note 104, art. 2. 
 106.  Montreal Protocol, supra note 104, art. 4.  
 107.  Secretariat of the Stockholm Convention, Stockholm Convention – Status of Ratifications, 
STOCKHOLM CONVENTION, http://chm.pops.int/Countries/Statusof Ratifications/tabid/252/Default.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2014).  
 108.  Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 3, May 22, 2001, 2256 U.N.T.S. 
119, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202256/v2256.pdf [hereinafter 
POPs Convention].  
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x x x 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
x x x 
Considering that the Philippines ratified MEAs with “anti-trade” 
elements, and the WTO’s own recognition and allowance of trade 
bans under specific circumstances,109 it appears that the argument 
against the Basel Ban as an “anti-trade” measure is not a major 
factor for the Philippines government. 
 
2. Economic Development / Supply of Raw Material. The economic 
development argument posits that recycling industries need raw materials 
for their facilities, and if the supply of raw materials is interrupted or 
stopped, this could adversely affect the industry and could result in 
dislocation of laborers, lowered income, further environmental degradation 
and flight of investments.  Thus, the Basel Ban, as an “anti-trade” measure 
is an impediment to hazardous raw materials, particularly those coming 
from Annex VII (developed countries). 
The focus of this article is not to prove or disprove the economic value 
of the Philippine hazardous waste recycling industry, but to focus on a 
specific element key to the economic argument, and that is supply of raw 
materials. 
In 1994, the Philippine Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR) released Administrative Order No. 28 on the Interim 
Guidelines for the Importation of Recyclable Materials Containing 
Hazardous Substances (AO 28).110  AO 28 affirms the country’s 
commitment to the Basel Convention, but upon approval of the DENR, will 
allow into the country the following wastes for “recovery, recycling and 
reprocessing:” 
 
i.   scrap metals (including used lead-acid batteries and metal bearing 
sludge) 
ii. solid plastic materials 
iii. electronic assemblies and scraps111 
 
 
 109.  For a discussion of the WTO Article XX (b) and (g) rules please see: WTO Rules and 
Environmental Policies: GATT Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/envir_e/envt_rules_exceptions_e.htm (last visited April 19, 2014). 
 110.  D.E.N.R. Admin. Ord. No. 28 (1994) (Phil.), available at http://www.emb.gov.ph 
/laws/toxic%20substances%20and%20hazardous%20wastes/dao94-28.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2014) 
[hereinafter AO28]. 
 111.  Id. at Annex A. 
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The exemption given to these classes of wastes raises a presumption 
that Executive Department deemed it important for the country to allow 
entry of these wastes in a controlled manner.  We focus our attention on the 
supply of ULABs and electronic assemblies and scraps (e-waste).  Note 
that these are both hazardous wastes under the Basel Convention, and are 
within the ambit of the Basel Ban.112 
 i. Supply of ULABs. The Philippine Association of Battery 
Manufacturer’s Inc. (PABMA) produces over 5 million standard battery 
units (SBUs) and provides employment to nearly 15,000.113 
PABMA is also one of the staunchest opponents of the Basel Ban 
because of the threat of a possible disruption in the supply of lead to its 
members.  Its membership needs 6,436 metric tons of ULABs every month 
to maintain the 5 million car batteries per month it can produce. There is an 
estimated domestic supply of about 3,300 metric tons of ULABs in the 
Philippines per month.  With the domestic supply insufficient to cover the 
production needs, a shortfall of 3,136 metric tons per month or an annual 
shortfall of almost 38,000 metric tons needs to be met.114  Further, since the 
Philippines does not have any primary source of lead, PABMA members 
are dependent on foreign sources of lead. 
The United Nations Comtrade data base115 contains a listing of the 
legal trade of commodities traded around the globe, including ULABs.  
Looking at the Philippine imports of ULABs for the past 13 years a picture 
emerges, see table below. 
 
 112.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, Annex VIII, available at http://www.basel.int/Portals/ 
4/Basel%20Convention/docs/text/BaselConventionText-e.pdf#page=73. The Basel Convention 
identifies ULABs as hazardous waste under Annex VIII, List A, A1160 Waste lead-acid batteries, 
whole or scrap.  Id.  E-waste is identified also in the same annex as A1180 waste electrical and 
electronic assemblies or scrap containing, components such as accumulators and other batteries 
included on list A, mercury-switches, activated glass cullets from cathode-ray tubes and other activated 
glass and PCB-capacitors, or contaminated with Schedule 2 constituents (e.g. cadmium, mercury, lead, 
polychlorinated biphenyl) to an extent that they exhibit hazard characteristics indicated in part C of this 
Schedule (refer B1110).  Id.  
 113.  Ateneo School of Government, Demystifying the Impacts of a Basel Ban Amendment 
Ratification by the Philippines (2014), draft and unpublished, at 34 [hereinafter ASOG Study].  
 114.  Id. 
 115.  The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) contains detailed 
imports and exports statistics reported by statistical authorities of close to 200 countries or areas. United 
Nations Statistics Division—Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), UN COMTRADE, 
http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). It concerns annual trade data from 
1962 to the most recent year.  Read Me First, UN COMTRADE, http://comtrade.un.org/ 
db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). Note the table was generated by using the 
following parameters: click “imports” under the “SHOW” box; typing in the HS Code 854810 only, as 
legal trade of ULABs should fall under this code; indicating the applicable years for the search “in the 
year” box; indicating “Philippines” in the “TO” box; specifying an exporting country in the “FROM” 
box, e.g. Thailand; and selecting “any” in the classification box.   
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Year Import (kg) Exporting 
Country 
2000 12,356 Malaysia 
336 Thailand 
Total  12,692  
2001 26,273 Thailand 
Total  26,273  
2002 207,000 Bulgaria 
10,500 Thailand 
Total 217,500  
2004 689,360 Bulgaria 
292,518 Malaysia 
19,380 Thailand 
Total 1,001,258  
2005 160,740 Papua New 
Guinea 
Total160,740  
2006 119,704 Papua New 
Guinea 
Total119,704  
2007 3,385,877 Sri Lanka 
Total 3,385,877  
2008 150,000 China 
6,210,905 New Zealand 
111,136 Papua New 
Guinea 
1,272,770 Singapore 
758,134 Sri Lanka 
Total 8,502,945  
2009 1,700,440 New Zealand 
9 Singapore 
6,512 United States of 
America 
Total1,706,961  
2010 106,730 Australia 
35,640 China, Hong Kong 
SAR 
438,015 New Zealand 
2,220,515 Singapore 
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447,050 United Arab 
Emirates 
401,725 Viet Nam 
Total 3,649,675  
2011 62,858 China 
7,079 Indonesia 
395,630 New Zealand 
4,441,725 Singapore 
8,339,402 United Arab 
Emirates 
Total  13,246,694  
2012 3,000 China 
43,000 Indonesia 
109,520 New Zealand 
18,332 Republic of Korea 
7,231,111 Singapore 
97,920 United Arab 
Emirates 
68 United States of 
America 
Total 7,502,951  
 
The data suggests that in the past 13 years the Philippines imported 
39,533,270 kgs of ULABs from various nations, developed and 
developing.  Developing country exports to the Philippines totalled 
30,547,118 kgs, comprising 77% of total ULAB imports into the country.  
Compared to 8,986,152 kgs, 23% of total imports, coming from developed 
nations (majority of the ULABs came from New Zealand). 
The above data confirms a changing trend in both hazardous waste 
generation and trade.  In the 1990s when the Basel Ban was born a majority 
of developed nations generated hazardous wastes.  At least the above 
ULAB trade data shows developing nations are increasing their generation 
and trade as well. 
The Basel Convention released a report in 2010 confirming the 
change in the overall hazardous waste generation and trade. For instance 
their data shows that trade between Annex VII to Non-Annex VII states 
from 2004 to 2006 decreased by 73%.  The Basel Convention report also 
explains the decrease in relation to the Basel Ban: 
[T]he data as reported does suggest that exports that would come 
under the Ban Amendment are limited in number, amount and seem to be 
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decreasing. . . . 
Lead and lead compounds are also moved in relatively large amounts 
between non-Annex VII countries. Most likely these are lead-acid batteries 
that are generated in a large number of non-Annex VII countries that do not 
have recycling facilities for the lead and that are recycled in a limited 
number of non-Annex VII countries. In particular, the Philippines recycles 
lead acid batteries from a number of Asian non-Annex VII 
countries . . . .116 
ii. E-waste Supply. Unlike ULABs, there are no e-waste associations 
in the Philippines who can share production data and raw materials 
requirements.  To approximate raw material demand a study conducted by 
the Ateneo School of Government looked at the official e-waste 
importation permitted by the Department of Environment from 2001 to 
2005 and found that Japan and China were the top source of e-wastes 
imported into the Philippines.117 Presumably the e-waste demand is to 
recover precious metals found in e-waste such as gold, copper, etc. to 
supply the needs of local the local electronics assembly industry or for 
further export as there are no smelters in the country that would need 
further supply of metals. 
The study extrapolated the e-waste raw material’s need of recycling 
industries in the country based on the quantity of imports for the period.  
According to the study the Philippine e-waste recycling industry demand 
could run in the range of 11,000 to 28,000 kgs, based on the available data.  
Thus, to maintain the facilities the industry would need to be ensured of a 
steady supply of e-waste in the above amount. 
To look at possible supply sources, the study turned its attention to 
domestic e-waste where an estimate was made that by 2015 there would be 
approximately 4 million tons of e-waste generated in the Philippines.  The 
study further concludes that the estimated local e-waste would be more 
than enough to cover the shortfall from a possible import prohibition from 
Annex VII countries like Japan. 
Given the ULAB and e-waste scenarios above, from a strict supply 
perspective, the threat of supply disruption in the face of the Basel Ban 
appears to be minimal.  Thus, the economic argument against the Basel 
Ban appears to be out of date in light of the historical trade data shown and 
the changing trend in hazardous waste generation and trade as confirmed 
by the Basel Convention. 
 
 116.  Kees Wielenga, SECRETARIAT OF THE BASEL CONVENTION, WASTE WITHOUT FRONTIERS 16 
(2010), available at http://archive.basel.int/pub/ww-frontiers31Jan2010.pdf. 
 117.  ASOG Study, supra note 113, at 39. 
Gutierrez (Do Not Delete) 12/4/2014  7:11 PM 
424 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:399 
 
3. Difficulty of Implementing the Basel Ban. The argument that the 
Basel Ban will be difficult to implement has two components: a) because 
major developing countries such as the US are not supporting it, and b) the 
requirement of financial, technical and human resources to implement the 
ban. 
i. Not supported by US and other hazardous waste generating 
countries. At the start a distinction needs to be made between parties and 
non-parties to the Basel Convention.  The US is in a special category all of 
its own as it is the only developed nation that is not party to the Basel 
Convention.118  As a non-party, the Basel Convention prohibits waste trade 
between parties and non-parties, thus, the US as a general rule will not be 
allowed to trade with a country that is party to Basel, regardless whether 
that party has ratified the Basel Ban or not. 
For the US to legally trade hazardous wastes to Basel parties, it will 
need to enter an agreement that is fully compliant with Article 11 of 
Basel.119  These agreements must not derogate from the environmentally 
sound management of hazardous wastes as required by the Convention, or 
stipulate provisions, which are less stringent than those under Basel.120  
Therefore, the US in order to legally trade with a Basel party will need to 
comply with the importing country’s laws as it relates to the Basel 
Convention. 
In a situation where it ratifies the Basel Ban, as a developing country 
the Philippines will modify its hazardous waste law in line with the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.121 The main element that it will need to 
transpose in its national law is an explicit prohibition against hazardous 
waste imports similar to the Basel Ban. After it modifies its local law, the 
government must report and notify the Basel Secretariat of these changes, 
which then puts all Basel parties on notice that the Philippines has effected 
a Basel Ban import prohibition, which will thereafter influence hazardous 
waste exports particularly from developed countries.122  For instance, AO 
28 on exemptions to e-waste and ULABs will need to be revisited and 
realigned with the Basel Ban obligations. 
 
 118.  See Signatories to Basel Convention, supra note 21 (noting that the United States has signed, 
but not yet ratified, the Convention, unlike many other developed countries that have, including France, 
Germany, etc.). 
 119.  See Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 11(1) (explaining when parties to the Convention 
may make agreements with other parties and non-parties regarding the movement of wastes). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 26–27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20115 5/v1155.pdf.  
 122.  Basel Convention, supra note 18, art. 13(2). 
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Thus, even though the US is not a party to the Basel Ban,123 if it were 
to attempt to trade with a country that has ratified the Basel Ban, the 
importing country under Article 11 of Basel and under the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda must ensure that agreements it makes with the US 
comply with its Basel Convention and Basel Ban obligations. 
The same process will apply to other developed nations party to Basel 
that may wish to trade with other Parties that have ratified the Basel Ban.  
In the case of the Philippines, for instance, if New Zealand exports ULABs 
to the Philippines, and the latter has ratified the Basel Ban and eliminates 
the ULAB exemption under AO 28, New Zealand is obligated under the 
Basel Convention to respect Philippine regulations that implement the 
latter’s Basel Ban obligations. 
In the above scenario, even if the developed nations opposed to the 
Basel Ban do not support it, the domestic law implementation of the Basel 
Ban in the importing states could prevent or make it difficult for these 
nations to trade their hazardous wastes.  In spite their opposition to the 
Basel Ban. 
ii. Financial, Manpower and Technical Costs. Developing countries 
are often concerned about the costs of implementing treaty obligations.  
The Basel Ban is not immune to these concerns. 
The critical difference with the Basel Ban, however, is that Annex VII 
exporting countries will bear the additional costs of implementation and 
not necessarily the developing countries.124  Note that the obligation to 
“prohibit” falls with the Annex VII countries.  The act of prohibiting 
necessarily entails a policy shift within the Annex VII state, and the 
corresponding enforcement of the policy. 
This is also in line with the recognition that developed nations are 
better equipped to monitor and enforce hazardous waste controls.125 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
International environmental justice continues to be an ideal that is 
elusive and one that developing countries are still struggling for.  Nineteen 
years after its adoption, the Basel Ban, an instrument that strengthens 
 
 123.  Signatories to Basel Convention, supra note 21. 
 124.  See Basel Ban, supra note 81, at ¶ 1 (noting that at previous Conference, a “request was made 
for the prohibition of hazardous waste shipments from industrialized countries to developing 
countries”). 
 125. See Basel Ban, supra note 80, § 3 (noting that “transboundary movements of hazardous 
wastes, especially to developing countries, have a high risk of not constituting an environmentally 
sound management of hazardous waste as required by this Convention”). 
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environmental justice at the global level, is still a paper tiger. 
The Philippine situation, however, has shown that a lot of the 
perceived weaknesses surrounding the Basel Ban no longer holds true.  As 
an anti-trade measure, not only have countries, such as the Philippines, 
acceded to other MEAs that have “anti-trade” measures such as the Basel 
Ban, but the WTO itself recognizes certain limits to trade through its 
GATT XX(b) provision. 
The argument that the Basel Ban will be a hindrance to formal 
recycling because of the obstacle it places on “raw materials” supply 
appears to no longer hold water as well. The concern over the lack of 
support by the US, Japan and other members of JUSCANZ will not 
necessarily make the Basel Ban difficult to implement.  Almost all the 
nations in the world are parties to the Basel Convention now. Thus, 
countries that ratify the Basel Ban can affect Basel Convention parties 
when the former realign their domestic laws to comply with the Basel Ban. 
The Basel Ban has and always been a developing country-driven and 
motivated instrument.  The Basel Ban will not come about by 
happenstance.  Each ratification that the Basel Ban garners in the coming 
years must be a clear demand from developing countries for international 
environmental justice. Rhetoric has no place in this endeavor. To achieve 
this, developing countries must re-examine their position vis-à-vis the 
Basel Ban, and go beyond the myths that have straddled the issue for so 
long. 
Countries, both developed and developing, must also begin a critical 
examination of how they apply environmental justice within their borders. 
The strength of a country’s international policy on any given issue, such as 
environmental justice, is derived from the strength of its own domestic 
policy. And perhaps, this is the only obstacle left unexamined for those 
countries waiting to ratify the Basel Ban. 
 
